Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 27, Issue 3

2003

Article 5

Trade, Democracy, and The FTAA Public
Access to the Process of Constructing a Free
Trade Area of the Americas
Eric Dannenmair∗

∗

Tulane Law School

Copyright c 2003 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

TRADE, DEMOCRACY, AND THE FTAA:
PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE PROCESS OF
CONSTRUCTING A FREE TRADE AREA OF
THE AMERICAS
Eric Dannenmaier*
INTRODUCTION
From outside police barricades, the Eighth Meeting of
Trade Ministers of the Americas looked familiar. Union rallies,
marches and sporadic violence greeted ministers as they met in
Miami in November 2003 to continue negotiating a Free Trade
Area of the Americas ("FTAA"). Anti-globalization and antiFTAA activists -joined by the agnostic and the merely curious
- descended on Miami to voice concerns over the proposed regional accord. In a pattern traced from the First Meeting of
Ministers in 1995 and punctuated during similar meetings for
* The author is director of the Institute for Environmental Law and Policy at Tulane Law School. From 1995-2000, he served as a legal advisor for the U.S. Agency for
International Development, and his work included support for the design and implementation of programs relating to Inter-American Summits. This Article is drawn in
part from proceedings of civil society conferences at the Seventh Trade Ministerial
Meeting of the Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA") in Quito, Ecuador in November 2002, and the Eighth Trade Ministerial Meeting of the FTAA in Miami, Florida in
November 2003. The author was co-chair of civil society workshops on trade and public
participation in both Quito and Miami, and prepared the reports of these proceedings.
The Quito report was prepared with support from Daniel Ryan (Fundaci6n Ambiente y
Recursos Naturales ("FARN"), Argentina), and Marfa Amparo Albin (Centro Ecuadoriano de Derecho Ambiental ("CEDA"), Ecuador). The Miami report was prepared with
support from Viviana Giacaman (Corporaci6n Participa, Chile). The proceedings from
Quito are published in HACIA LA PARTICIPACION DE LA SOCIEDAD CIVIL EN LAS AMERICAS,
MEMORIAS

DE LOS TALLERES SOBRE COMERCIO

Y AMBIENTE EN LA REUNION MINISTERIAL

DEL ALCA [TOWARDS CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN THE AMERICAS, MEMOIRS OF THE

TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT WORKSHOPS IN THE FTAA QUITO MINISTERIAL] 67 (2003), available at http://www.ceda.org.ec/documentos/memorias-ingles.pdf (last visited Jan. 27,
2004). The Miami proceedings are not yet published, but a pre-publication copy is on
file with the author. This Article was prepared with the support of Rebekah Salguero,
Lina Uribe-Garcia, andJoselle Lamoutte (all students at Tulane Law School), who provided research assistance and served as rapporteurs in Miami; and Aylin Acikalin and
Genifer Tarkowski (Tulane Law School), who provided research assistance. The author
wishes to thank these friends and colleagues, and to acknowledge the support and work
of the many participants in both Quito and Miami. The author also wishes to acknowledge the work and dedication of Dr. Robin Rosenberg of the University of Miami,
whose personal and professional sacrifices made the Americas Forum for Trade and
Sustainable Development at the Miami Ministerial Meeting possible.
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the World Trade Organization ("WTO") such as the one in Seattle in 1998, trade activists used the occasion of the Ministerial
meeting as a symbolic attention-getting device, but harbored little hope for meaningful dialogue with the assembled ministers
and their delegations.
Inside the barricades, however, the landscape was changing.
For the first time since FTAA negotiations had begun in 1995,
governments offered a forum for non-profit, public interest, civil
society organizations' ("CSOs") to debate the proposed trade
agreement and engage trade negotiators inside the so-called
"hard security perimeter."
Business interests (philosophically trade-positive) had won
more robust access to ministers and delegates since the First
1. The term Civil Society Organization ("CSO") is used in this Article rather than
Non-Governmental Organization ("NGO") to emphasize the non-profit nature of the
organizations upon which this Article focuses. In practice, access to trade policy-making for the non-profit, or public interest, sector is distinct from access for business associations, chambers of commerce, and other organizations representing private, forprofit interests. Many hold that civil society generally encompasses all non-State actors
(non-governmental, non-legislative, non-military). See e.g., Linda C. McClain &James E.
Fleming, Foreword: Legal and ConstitutionalImplications of the Calls to Revive Civil Society,
75 CHi.-KENr L. REV. 289 (2000) (defining civil society as "a realm between the individual and the State, including the family and religious, civic, and other voluntary associations"). Others hold to a narrower definition of CSOs. See Samuel H. Barnes, The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies, 95 Am. J. INT'L. L. 86, 99 (Jan.
2001) (noting that "some define civil society as excluding associations that take a direct
part in the political process"). The purpose of the distinction, though, is not to wade
into that broader theoretical debate. For a view of the broader debate, see generally,
JOHN EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY- THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1999); Tom Palmer,
'Civil Society' no Longer Means What it is Supposed to Mean, 1J. Civ. Soc'y 6, 12 (June-July
1997), available at http://www.civnet.org/journal/issue2/jftpalm.htm. Rather, the distinction is critical from a theoretical and a practical standpoint in the context of international trade policy. At a theoretical level, for-profit and not-for-profit interests have
diverged over the rationale for shaping international trade policy with the former tending to emphasize the potential economic benefits of trade and the latter tending to
emphasize the broader social concerns. At a practical level, the for-profit and nonprofit sectors not only speak from different perspectives, but they have sought, and
been afforded, different types and degrees of access to the treasury, commerce and
trade officials who shape trade policy and draft trade agreements. While the for-profit
sector has generally been perceived as pro-trade and has thus sought and been granted
a more robust dialogue about the details of trade agreements, the non-profit sector has
been far more ambivalent, heterogeneous and in some cases antagonistic to trade. The
experience of non-profit groups has, perhaps consequently, ranged from being welcomed by trade negotiators and trade allies to being turned away outright. This Article
deals with access for the range of non-profit sector actors - those who may perceive
benefits or harms from the proposed FT'AA; that is to say, civil society voices that may
bring harmony or disharmony to the FTAA discourse.
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Ministerial meeting in Denver in 1995, through workshops, cocktail parties, and thinly veiled lobbying efforts collectively denominated the Americas Business Forum ("ABF"). 2 But non-profit,
public interest organizations (philosophically trade-negative or
trade-ambivalent) had largely remained outside the formal Ministerial process, relegated to demonstrating or organizing parallel forums through coalitions such as the Hemispheric Social Alliance ("HSA"), 3 which rely on teach-ins and street theater to
gain attention and bring public pressure on negotiators.
While some governments have taken steps to open their
trade policy-making to scrutiny and dialogue at a national level,
prior to the Miami Summit no real public space had been created at a multilateral level for dialogue between representatives
charged with negotiating an FTAA, and citizens who might challenge the details of the agreement. Instead, two separate discourses developed: one among governments negotiating under
a cloak of confidentiality (with access for business leaders who
largely supported their efforts), and the other among citizens
outside the process. Prior FTAA Ministerial meetings in Toronto and Quebec, had seen brief, symbolic (and at times, surreal) meetings between a subset of CSOs and ministers who exchanged prepared statements and largely talked past each other.
But Miami brought the civil society debate itself to a new "inside"
status - at the doorstep of the delegates - and brought the
delegates much closer to the concerns of their constituents.
As the FTAA Ministerial process has begun to open up,
some obstacles have been overcome and others have been uncovered. But, in a word, public access to the multilateral negotiations for the FTAA has made progress.
This Article explores that progress. It traces the history of
efforts by CSOs to engage senior government officials during
FTAA Ministerial meetings, and highlights the priorities identified by civil society for strengthening the discourse and "democratizing" an FTAA. The Article also explores normative and
practical issues surrounding public access to a multilateral pro2. The Americas Business Forum ("ABF") is informally governed and relies on host
committees in Ministerial cities to provide structure and financing for specific Ministerial meetings. See discussion infra Part V.A. For a view of the ABF, its perspectives and
tactics, see, e.g., the website of the Miami host committee, available at http://www.
miamiftaa2003.com/about-objective.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
3. See discussion infra Part V.B.
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cess traditionally reserved for bureaucrats in a field traditionally
reserved for technocrats. Finally, it describes a governmental initiative emerging from Miami to address some of these issues by
creating a permanent consultative mechanism for civil society in
the trade agreement itself, and offers some insights into the demands on such a mechanism.
The Article concentrates on access for non-profit or "public
interest" elements of civil society rather than for-profit business
interests, because public interest organizations have been more
marginalized from the FTAA, and their interests are more diffuse and conflicting - rendering their integration more problematic. It also concentrates on the multilateral process in the
context of Ministerial meetings rather than trade policymaking
at a national level because of the symbolic value attached to
meetings of ministers, and the unique opportunities for public
dialogue offered by these high-level meetings.
I. THE FFAA IN CONTEXT
In 1994, presidents and heads of State from thirty-four of
the thirty-five Western Hemisphere States4 met in Miami for
what was billed as the "First Summit of the Americas." In fact, it
was the Third Presidential Summit in the Americas following the
Second World War; the prior summits convened in 1956 and
1967. 5 It was, however, the first meeting of leaders who could all
claim to have been democratically elected. This distinction has
become a central point in Inter-American summitry, and in the
plans of action that emerge from the summits. It is also at the
core of demands for greater public access to the FTAA.
The Miami Summit Plan of Action contained numerous
commitments and pledges for action under twenty-three head4. A Summit invitation was not issued to Cuba, which has been prevented from
taking its seat as a Member State of the Organization of American States ("OAS") since
1962. See Jost Luis RESTREPO, EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO: PERSPECTIVA HISTORICA
[THE PAN-AMERICAN SYSTEM: HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE] (White Paper from the OAS Secretariat of Juridical Affairs, 2003), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/
jos6 luis restrepo.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2004) (on file with author).
5. Richard Feinberg, Address Before the Inter-American Dialogue (Sept. 20,
1994), in ADVANCING THE MIAMI PROCESS: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS 42 (Robin Rosenberg & Steve Stein eds., 1995) [hereinafter ADVANCING THE PROCESS]. Richard Feinberg was then the Special Assistant to the President of the United
States and Senior Director for Inter-American Affairs, National Security Council.
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ings grouped in four principal chapters, or "baskets":6
" preserving and strengthening the community of democracies in the Americas;
" promoting prosperity through economic integration and
free trade;
* eradicating poverty and discrimination in our hemisphere; and
* guaranteeing sustainable development and conserving
our natural environment for future generations.7
These themes have been repeated and expanded in subsequent summits in Santa Cruz, Bolivia in 1996, Santiago, Chile in
1998, and Quebec City, Canada in 2001.8 A "special" or "extraordinary" summit was held in Monterrey, Mexico in January
2004 and again the themes echo those from the First Summit in
Miami: economic growth with equity; social development; and
democratic governance.9
While these presidential meetings have revealed a broad array of social and political ambitions - from health, education,
and the environment to urban poverty, human rights and democracy - many governments in the region stake their princi6. 1 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE SUMMIT PROCESS FROM MIAMI TO SANTIAGO 213-40
(OAS, 1998); First Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of
Action, Miami, Florida, Dec. 11, 1994, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 808, at 810 (1995) [hereinafter First Summit: Declaration of Principles].
7. First Summit: Declaration of Principles, supra note 6, 34 I.L.M. at 814.
8. The Bolivia Summit was denominated the "Summit of the Americas on Sustainable Development" and has been classified as a "special summit." Summit of the Americas on Sustainable Development: Declaration of Principles, Santa Cruz de la Sierra,
Bolivia, Dec. 8, 1996, available at http://www.summit-americas.org/Boliviadec.htm
[hereinafter Santa Cruz Summit]. As a result, the subsequent meeting in Santiago was
referred to as the "Second" summit, and the one in Quebec City as the "Third." Second
Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Santiago, Chile,
Apr. 19, 1998, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 947 (1998) [hereinafter Second Summit: Declaration of Principles]; Third Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles, Quebec
City, Canada, Apr. 22, 2001, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/summits/quebec/
declara e.asp [hereinafter Third Summit: Declaration of Principles]. A complete summary of all summits, including official documents and their plans of action, can be
found at http://www.summit-americas.org/eng-2002/previous-summits.htm.
The Office of Summit Follow-up, General Secretariat, Organization of American States has also
published a set of "Official Documents," in three volumes as of early 2004 (copies on
file with the author).
9. Special Summit of the Americas, Monterrey, Mexico, Jan. 13, 2004 (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Mexico Summit]. Updated information on the Mexico Summit
can be found at http://www.summit-americas.org/SpecialSummit/Mainpage-eng.htm
or http://www.comormex.org/ceamexico/web/home.php.
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pal ambition on regional economic integration.' In a word:
trade. Some consider the prospect of an FTAA the "crown
jewel" of the summit process - and it has certainly garnered the
greatest resources and attention." While many summit commitments have been orphaned, and others succeed only because
particular governments or constituencies have taken an interest, 12 the pursuit of an FTAA has been robust and well funded.
A tripartite committee of the Inter-American Development
Bank, the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean, and the Organization of American States
("OAS") has been tasked with promoting the FTAA, t3 and trade
ministers have met annually since the Miami Summit to advance
the process. At the 2002 Ministerial meeting in Quito, Ecuador,
ministers agreed to establish a Hemispheric Cooperation Program ("HCP") to fund capacity-building initiatives aimed at improving the ability of states to participate in, and benefit from,
an FTAA.14 By 2000, when FTAA negotiations officially began,
working groups had already been established to hammer out the
details of the proposed agreement, and these working groups in
many cases became the formal negotiating groups to prepare an

10. This conclusion is based on numerous conversations by the author with government officials, summit negotiators, and summit officials between 1995 and 2003,
and on the author's participation as an observer and advisor in the context of summit
preparatory meetings and summit follow-up programs. During this time, the author
served first as an advisor to the United States Agency for International Development in
designing summit follow-up initiatives and later as an advisor to the OAS in implementing summit programs.
11. Id. See also LEADERSHIP COUNCIL FOR INTER-AMERICAN SUMMITRY, ADVANCING ToWARD QUEBEC CITY AND BEYOND: POLICY REPORT III 7-10 (2001) [hereinafter LEADERSHIP COUNCIL REPORT].

12. See From Talk to Action: How Summits Can Help Forge a Western Hemisphere Community of Prosperous Democracies (Leadership Council for Inter-American Summitry, Mar.
1998), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/geograph/westernh/summit01.asp; Advancing Toward Quebec City and Beyond (Leadership Council for Inter-American Summitry, Mar. 2001), available at http://www.focal.ca/images/pdf/lciasiii-final.pdf. See also
Annual Report of the Secretary General: 2001-2003, OEA/Ser.D/III.53, at 55 (OAS,
2003) (stating that the Tripartite Committee began its term in July 2002).
13. Free Trade Area of the Americas: Seventh Trade Ministerial Meeting, Declaration of Ministers, Quito, Ecuador, Nov. 1, 2002, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/
Ministerials/Quito/Quitoe.asp (creating tripartite committee) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration of Quito]. See also Free Trade Area of the Americas, Antecedents of the
FTAA Process, at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/View-e.asp#STRUCTURE (last visited Mar.
16, 2004).
14. Ministerial Declaration of Quito, supra note 13.
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5

FTAA text. 1

In short, regional trade is front and center - the sine qua
non - in hemispheric integration policy. Whether pursued
through a regional FTAA, or through sub-regional or bilateral
agreements, 16 the prospect of trade has brought governments to
the table and serves as a prime motivator of political behavior
and compromise.
At the same time, trade does not stand in isolation, at least

in theory. The proposal for an FFAA emerged from the context
of broader social commitments made through the presidential
summits and other regional instruments."t Chief among these
commitments is the promise of greater participatory democracy
in the region.

15. For details on the "preparatory phase" working groups, now official negotiating groups, see the FTAA official website at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ngroup-e.asp
(last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
16. As of the writing of this Article, it is still unclear whether an FTAA, per se, will
be successfully negotiated and ratified by participating countries. There has been progress, most recently in the Miami Ministerial meeting, and while some have argued that
the document may be watered down, an FTAA is still a strong possibility. See, e.g.,James
Miller, Accord Offers Buffet-Style Free Trade; Nations Can Spurn Parts They Dislike, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 21, 2003, at Cl. At the same time, the United States and other countries are
pursuing sub-regional agreements, such as the Central America Free Trade Agreement
("CAFTA") (for which negotiations concluded in December 2003) and bilateral trade
agreements.

For example, in a FINANCIAL TITMES editorial, U.S. Trade Representative

Bob Zoellick stated that the United States will move forward with "can-do" countries
where multilateral agreements are not feasible. Robert Zoellick, America Will Not Wait
for the Won't-Do Countries, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at 23. Later, a U.S. trade official
speaking on background at a meeting of the Global Business Dialogue and the National
Foreign Trade Council was quoted as saying that the United States will "push ahead
with bilateral and regional agreements" where broader multilateral agreements are not
possible. See Rossella Brevetti, Trade Policy: US. Trade Official Says Trade Liberalization
Will Be Harderfor U.S. After Cancun Collapse, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Sept. 29, 2003, at

DI 0. The United States has already started preliminary bilateral trade talks with Colombia, Peru, and other countries in the region, as a back up to broader multilateral accords. See InternationalNegotiations: Zoellick Announces FFA Talks With FourAndean Countries, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Nov. 19, 2003, at D14.
17. See ADVANCING THE PROCESS, supra note 5; see also LEADERSHIP COUNCIL REPORT,
supra note 11; 3 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE SUMMIT PROCESS FROM MIAMI TO QUEBEC

(Office of Summit Follow-up, General Secretariat, OAS, 2002), availableat www.summitamericas.org (last visited Feb. 18, 2004) (providing full text of all Summit Declarations
and Plans of Action).
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II. COMMITMENTS TO DEMOCRACY AMD
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
A. Inter-American Summits and the Democratic Charter
From the early 1990s, Inter-American presidential summits
have been grounded in the fundamental idea that the thirty-four
active States in the Inter-American System are nominal democracies. This is a common denominator in regional relations, and it
was made a condition precedent for continued participation in
the presidential summit process through the so-called "democracy clause" in the Quebec Summit Declaration, where presidents declared:
We acknowledge that the values and practices of democracy
are fundamental to the advancement of all our objectives.
The maintenance and strengthening of the rule of law and
strict respect for the democratic system are, at the same time,
a goal and a shared commitment and are an essential condition of our presence at this and future Summits. Consequently, any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the
democratic order in a state of the Hemisphere constitutes an
insurmountable obstacle to the participation of that state's
government in the Summit of the Americas process. Having
due regard for existing hemispheric, regional and sub-regional mechanisms, we agree to conduct consultations in the
event of a disruption of the democratic 1 8system of a country
that participates in the Summit process.
The Quebec City Declaration thus created a condition precedent for summit participation and at the same time contemplated extending this condition to the broader scope of InterAmerican relations. In a subsequent provision, heads of State
instructed their foreign ministers to prepare a charter document
"to reinforce OAS instruments for the active defense of representative democracy." 9 This led to the preparation and adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter ("IADC") in
Lima, Peru on September 11, 2001.20 The IADC commits countries in the region to democratic principles and democratic be18. Third Summit: Declaration of Principles, supra note 8.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Inter-American Democratic Charter, 28th Spec. Sess., OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/
AG/RES.I (XXVIII-E/01) (OAS General Assembly) (Sept. 11, 2001) [hereinafter
IADC].
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havior in broad terms, and disqualifies States from participating
in Inter-American relations and mechanisms where the "democratic order" is "interrupted" or "seriously impaired.'
Article 19 of the IADC states:
Based on the principles of the Charter of the OAS and subject to its norms, and in accordance with the democracy
clause contained in the Declaration of Quebec City, an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state, constitutes, while it persists, an insurmountable obstacle to its
government's participation in sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the Councils of the Organization, the specialized conferences, the commissions, working
groups, and other bodies of the Organization.22
Article 19 thus confirms, as some countries have long maintained, that the existence of a "democratic order" is a pre-requisite to OAS participation under the charter and norms of the
organization. The IADC also extends the requirement to conferences, commissions, working groups, and "other bodies" of the
OAS. 23

B. The Democratic Charterand a Right of Access
For citizens demanding access to a more democratic FTAA
who might view the IADC as a binding mandate, article 19 raises
two key questions. First, is the IADC a binding legal instrument?
Second, to what extent does the "democratic order" connote
participatory, as opposed to electoral or constitutional, democracy? While this Article will not respond definitively to these
24
questions, it offers at least a brief examination.
While article 19 of the IADC may appear binding on its face
- stating that disruptions or impairments of the "democratic
21. Id. art. 19.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. This Article focuses on the construction of access mechanisms by governments
against a background of regional guidelines and presidential promises. It recognizes
that governments are beginning to construct these mechanisms on a voluntary basis,
but does not argue that such mechanisms are legally mandated through any binding
instrument. A more complete examination of this argument, and the legal implications
of the Quebec Democracy Clause and article 19 of the IADC is certainly warranted, but
it is beyond this Article's scope.
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order" are an "insurmountable obstacle" to continued participation in the Inter-American System - it fails to prescribe or prohibit specific conduct, and this vagueness minimizes the normative value of the provision. Further, article 19 is not self-executing and the implementation mechanism, described in article 20,
introduces a political element that limits its application in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances. Under article 20, if an
OAS Member State (or the Secretary General) believes that the
democratic order of a neighboring State has been threatened, it
may request that a "collective session" of the OAS Permanent
Council be convoked. The Permanent Council must then "undertake a collective assessment of the situation and... take such
decisions as it deems appropriate. '25 Because the Permanent
Council is a political, rather than a judicial body, the assessment
will likely be based on pragmatic and political considerations not a judicial determination. Thus, while article 19 might well
give rise to a process that could suspend a State's participation in
regional mechanisms, it lacks the certainty and precision that are
the hallmarks of a binding legal norm.
Even where article 19 can be brought to bear in the case of
a "democratically challenged" State, its applicability to lapses in
participatory democracy remains an obstacle to those seeking access to trade policy. The language of article 19 suggests that a
failure of democracy must be of such magnitude to challenge
the underlying political structure of a country before any threat
of sanction or suspension is triggered. Certainly a military or
administrative coup would constitute an "unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime." 26 But the failure or refusal of
a government to operate transparently or to consult its citizens
on the development of national policies such as trade, without
more, would not tip the scale. This is particularly true if national
legislative and constitutional frameworks do not mandate such a
consultation.

27

This is not to say that the LADC is concerned only with a
25. IADC art. 20.
26. Id. art. 19.
27. A case could be made for considering clearly ultra vires governmental actions
as a challenge to the democratic order at a constitutional level, but probably not without evidence that national judicial remedies had been exhausted or were ineffectual.
Even then, the OAS Charter principle of non-intervention would present an obstacle.
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naked coup or constitutional crisis. The broader treatment of
democracy in the Charter suggests that its signatories recognize
a goal beyond simply clean elections and an unimpeded executive. The IADC explicitly links participation to the "full and effective exercise of democracy:"
Representative democracy is strengthened and deepened by
permanent, ethical, and responsible participation of the citizenry within a legal framework
conforming to the respective
28
constitutional order.

But this language emphasizes that participation will
strengthen democracy; it does not suggest that the lack of participation, in itself, will bring down the democratic order. The
IADC also speaks in terms of a "right" to participate:
It is the right and responsibility of all citizens to participate in
decisions relating to their own development. This is also a
necessary condition for the full and effective exercise of democracy. Promoting and fostering
diverse forms of participa29
tion strengthens democracy.

This language - despite the use of normative terms like
"right" and "necessary condition" - does not clearly connect
participation to article 19 and its potential consequences. Article 6 certainly has relevance for the construction of an FTAA
because decisions about international trade policy are linked to
development - both implicitly where they represent a principal
development strategy for the region, and explicitly through the
presidential summit documents. But article 6 does not bind signatories to any particular course of conduct, and no enforcement provision or sanctions are afforded where rights are denied." Thus, despite the language of rights, the participation
articles of the IADC are more in the nature of non-binding statements of principle than normative tools.
C. Internationaland Regional Instruments and a Claim of Access
Beyond the IADC, participation and access have been the
28. IADC art. 2.
29. Id. art. 6.
30. An argument could be constructed that these articles, taken together with national rights and other Inter-American instruments, might give rise to a claim for access
in particular circumstances, but such an argument would be more productively made at
a national level, rather than a regional level.
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subject of a number of international and regional instruments
signed and ratified by States in the Inter-American System. One
of the first clear expressions of the right to participate was in the
Declaration that emerged from the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development in 1992 ("Rio Declaration").
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration states:
At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate
access to information concerning the environment that is
held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States
shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access
to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress
and remedy, shall be provided. 3"
Thus, Principle 10 "not only links participation in political
processes to sustainable development, but also establishes three
key principles that have since become the focus of formulating
participation policy. These three principles can be described as:
access to information; access to process; and access to justice."32
The language appears mandatory - individuals "shall have appropriate access." But it suffers the same debility as article 6 of
the IADC: it does not bind States to any particular course of
conduct.3"
At the Inter-American regional level, participation rights
have repeatedly been addressed in presidential summits from
Miami to Quebec City. In Miami in 1994, heads of State af34
firmed "the right of all citizens to participate in government.
They also committed to "facilitate fuller participation of our people in political . . .activity, in accordance with national legislation. 35 In Santa Cruz in 1996, heads of State and government
pledged to " [s]upport and encourage, as a basic requisite for sustainable development, broad participation by civil society in the
decision-making process, including policies and programs and
31. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Principle
10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev. 1 (1992).
32. Eric Dannenmaier, Democracy in Development: Toward a Legal Framework for the
Americas, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (Winter 1997) [hereinafter Democracy in Development].
33. The Rio Declaration is, as an instrument, even less binding in character than
the IADC.
34. First Summit: Declaration of Principles, supra note 6, 34 I.L.M. at 810.
35. Id. at 811.
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their design, implementation, and evaluation."3 6
In Santiago in 1998, heads of State extended principles of
participation explicitly to the FTAA:
The FI'AA negotiating process will be transparent ... in order to create the opportunities for the full participation by all
countries. We encourage all segments of civil society to participate in and contribute to the process in a constructive
manner, through our respective mechanisms of dialogue and
consultation and by presenting their views through the mechanism created in the FTAA negotiating process.

The Santiago Declaration also includes a pledge to "promote the
necessary actions for government institutions to become more
'' 8
participatory structures. 1
The Quebec Summit in 2001 went further. In addition to
the Democracy Clause,3 heads of State declared their commitment to "the full participation of all persons in the political, economic, social and cultural life of our countries."40 They also addressed participation in the context of an FTAA, committing to:
Ensure the transparency of the negotiating process, including
through publication of the preliminary draft FTAA Agreement in the four official languages as soon as possible and the
dissemination of additional information on the progress of
negotiations;
[and to] Foster through their respective national dialogue
mechanisms and through appropriate FTAA mechanisms, a
process of increasing and sustained communication with civil
society to ensure that it has a clear perception of the development of the FTAA negotiating process; [and to] invite civil
society to continue to contribute to the FTAA process ....41
Thus the presidential summits, which have established both the
impetus and context for an FTAA, clearly contemplate public
access to the negotiating process and the FTAA itself as a central
part of that process.
The OAS, part of the FTAA tripartite committee and the
36. Santa Cruz Summit, supra note 8, at 8.
37. Second Summit: Declaration of Principles, supra note 8, 37 I.L.M. at 950 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 951.
39. See supra Part II.A.
40. Third Summit: Declaration of Principles, supra note 8, at 3.
41. Id., Plan of Action at 14-15.
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central inter-governmental organization in the Western Hemisphere, has also sought to advance citizen participation through
a multi-year process of technical consultation and dialogue
among governments and representatives of civil society. This
process resulted in a strategy document, called the Inter-American
Strategy for the Promotion of PublicParticipationin Decision-makingfor

Sustainable Development ("ISP"), which was adopted by the OAS
Inter-American Council on Integral Development ("OAS/
CIDI") in April 2000.42 The strategy provides a set of guidelines
that are applicable at a national and regional level for strengthening participation. The ISP guidelines embrace six principles
and offer "policy recommendations," including specific recommendations on legal frameworks and institutional procedures
and structures:4"
Legal Frameworks Recommendation: Create, expand, and implement legal and regulatoryframeworks that ensure the participation
of civil society in sustainabledevelopment decisions.

Meaningful public participation in decision-making processes
on sustainable development depends on laws and regulations
that will ensure access to relevant and timely information, access to the decision-making process, and access to the justice
system. In addition, legal frameworks should clarify and expand the legal standing of those persons and communities
affected by development decisions, seek a reasonable balance
in the roles and joint responsibilities of the various levels of
government and civil society, and be adapted continuously to
respond to changing reality or when they constitute an obstacle to public participation.
Institutional Procedures and Structures
Recommendation: Develop and support institutional structures,
policies, and procedures that promote and facilitate, within all levels
of government and civil society, interaction in sustainable development decisions, and encourage change within existing institutions to
pursue a basisfor long-term direct dialogue and innovative solutions.

Where necessary, institutions should strengthen and develop
management mechanisms to expand and incorporate par42. See Inter-American Strategy for the Promotion of Public Participationin Decision-Makingfor SustainableDevelopment, Organization of American States, Inter-American Council
on Integral Development, CIDI Res. 98 (V-O/00) OEA/Ser.W/II.5, Apr. 20, 2000, available at http://www.ispnet.org/Documents/CEPCIDI/ESTRAENG.RTF
[hereinafter
ISP]. The ISP technical report adopted by the OAS Council on Integral Development
consisted of a Policy Framework and a set of Policy Recommendations. Id.
43. See ISP Policy Framework, supra note 42, arts. 2, 3.
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ticipatory practices and techniques in project design, implementation, and evaluation. The creation of partnerships between government and civil society, including all stakeholders, should be encouraged.44
Beyond this strategic framework, the OAS has also created
an accreditation program in an effort to open political meetings,
45
technical consultations and other OAS processes to CSOs.
Modeled to some extent on the accreditation system of United
Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization
(UNESCO)," the OAS process is overseen by the Summits of the
Americas Secretariat and it has made some progress in opening
doors once closed to the public.4"
D. Legal Rights vs. Moral Obligations
Taken together, presidential summit commitments, the ISP,
OAS accreditation, and the IADC demonstrate progress toward
regional participatory frameworks, even participatory rights, in
the Americas. In each case, the language can be tied explicitly
or implicitly to the proposed FTAA, raising the prospect, at least,
of a claim to participatory rights within such an agreement. But
it would be difficult to argue that these instruments, without
more, create a legally binding right to public participation in
trade policy-making at a regional level. While the right to participate is universally acknowledged in the region, the standing
to demand access to the FTAA process would appear for now less
legal than moral.
III. ACCESS TO FTAA NEGOTIATING GROUPS -

THE SOC

At the San Jose Ministerial meeting in 1998, governments
44. Id.
45. See generally Civil Society Participation in OAS Activities, at http://www.civilsociety.oas.org (providing details about the accreditation program).
46. See Guidelines for the Participation of Civil Society Organizations in OAS Activities, adopted by the Permanent Council through resolution CP/RES. 759 (1217/99),
and endorsed by the General Assembly through resolution AG/RES. 1707 (XXX-O/
00).
47. Accredited CSOs have been invited to annual meetings with OAS staff and
officials in Washington, D.C., and the OAS has created a forum within the annual OAS
General Assembly for CSOs to present concerns directly to foreign ministers and vice
ministers. In addition, the Secretariat has facilitated participation by CSOs in OAS and
Summit-related events. See generally OAS Registration/Participation Mechanisms
(2004) at http://www.civil-society.oas.org/English%20MAIN%20-2.htm.
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agreed to create the Committee of Government Representatives
on the Participation of Civil Society ("SOC") 4 8 to serve as a point
of entry to the FIAA negotiating process for civil society. From
1998 through 2002, the SOC seemed to serve as little more than
a post office box where written comments were deposited by
CSOs and then distributed to technical working groups, depending on the subject of the comment. The mechanism was widely
criticized as undifferentiated (it dealt with all issues that may
arise from civil society without specialization), uni-directional
(comments were a one-way street with no response from government and no dialogue), and superficial (no depth of expertise
was expressed or implied in the committee itself).
The SOC also had no way to deal with public concerns in
areas where no negotiating groups had been formed around key
issues and chapters of the agreement, and this was the case with
several key public concerns over the FTAA. 4m Thus, where comments related to an area where no negotiating group existed,
such as trade and environment, no working group or committee
could claim competence over the issue and citizen comments
became dead letters. Even where a specific comment went to
the heart of a negotiating group, the group has no obligation to
respond to, or even consider, the input received.
The SOC has more recently supplemented its post office
box function by holding periodic issue meetings that began in
2003, and sub-regional "seminars" on the broader theme of "opportunities and challenges of the FTAA."5 ° The SOC is also the
forum where governments formally launched the idea of a per48. Ironically, many governments call this committee the "Civil Society Committee" and members of civil society call it the "Committee of Government Representatives."
49. Current negotiating groups include Agriculture; Antidumping and Countervailing Duties; Competition Policy; Dispute Settlement; Government Procurement; Intellectual Property Rights; Investment; Market Access; Services; and Subsidies. No
group has been formed, for example, to deal with environmental or labor concerns
despite the prominence of these concerns. For a list of submissions (and in some cases
links to the submissions themselves), see FTAA, Participationof Civil Society, Contributions
Received, at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/SPCOMM/COMMCS_E.ASP.
50. Three issue meetings have been held to date: Agriculture, in Sao Paolo, Brazil
on June 28, 2003; Services, in Santiago, Chile on Sept. 23, 2003; and Intellectual Property Rights, in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic on Jan. 28, 2004. See FTAA, Participation of Civil Society, Issue Meetings, at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/SPCOMM/
COMMCSE.ASP (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
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manent consultative mechanism within the FTAA, 5I and to
which the responsibility for studying and shaping such a mechanism was assigned during the Miami Ministerial meeting.5 2
This represents important progress from the first four years
of the SOC's operation. Not only has the SOC become more
proactive in its relations with the public during the negotiation
of the FTAA, but it has also become something of an advocate
for integrating citizens into the administration of the FTAA.5"
The ultimate impact of these efforts will depend upon the ability
of SOC members to continue engaging the public on priority
issues during the negotiations, to communicate public priorities
effectively to negotiators, and to broaden the scope of the dialogue to areas where CSOs have repeatedly expressed concern
(such as environment and labor). The SOC's impact will also be
measured by its success in structuring a meaningful consultative
mechanism within the FTAA - and in assuring the adoption of
such a mechanism by negotiators.
IV. ACCESS TO FFAA ADMINISTRATIONDRAFT TEXT

THE

The first release of official text was delayed until July 2001,
more than six years after the first meeting of ministers in Denver. The text was so preliminary that almost all controversial issues were bracketed, often in several alternate forms. 54 No interpretation was offered as to the concerns that led to the bracketing, the technical issues underlying the concerns, or the
positions of governments. Meaningful public input relating to
51. The Chilean government has taken a particular interest in strengthening the
SOC and has shown leadership in the effort to gain broader acceptance for the idea.
See Ecuadorian Center for Environmental Law and the Foundation for the Future of
Latin America ("CEDA/FFLA") Proceedings, infra Part VIA; Americas Trade and Sustainable Development Forum ("ATSDF") Proceedings (unpublished article) (on file
with author) [hereinafter ATSDF Proceedings].
52. See infra Part VII.B.1.
53. The proposed permanent consultative mechanism approved for study in the
Ministerial Declaration of Miami emerged from the SOC in Miami. See Free Trade Area
of the Americas: Eighth Trade Ministerial Meeting, Declaration of Ministers, art. 28,
Miami, Florida, Nov. 20, 2003, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Ministerials/
Miami/Miamie.asp [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration of Miami]; see also discussion
infra Part VII.B. 1.
54. It is common in the negotiation of international accords to set apart with
brackets, text that has been proposed by one or more parties, but not yet accepted as
part of a unified draft text.
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this text was necessarily rendered somewhat hypothetical. A revised draft of the text was released in conjunction with the Quito
Ministerial in November 2002, and again during the Miami Ministerial in 2003, but both suffer the same debilities. Difficult issues remain bracketed and no explanatory text is provided.
An examination of the draft FTAA released in 2002 reveals a
text largely devoid of public access to the institutions, procedures, and mechanisms that will be established under the agreement. In the 2002 draft text on "General and Institutional Issues," the preamble mentions "democratic values" and a "democratic and just society[,]" but these are limited and transitory
references, and in both cases the language is still bracketed.5 5
The same chapter also refers to "advancing economic prosperity" in a manner "[consistent with the underlying principles [of
the Summit of the Americas] and overall objectives of the Summit of the Americas process;]]."56 Because Summit objectives
fully embrace participatory decision-making, 5 this reference
would appear to provide a theoretical foundation for participation under the FTAA. But again, the language only appears
once, without elaboration or detail, and it remains bracketed.
A section on "Transparency" in the latest draft is focused
principally on transparency between and among States' parties,
not the broader public. Only one part of this section moves beyond inter-governmental transparency to call for relevant "laws,
regulations, judicial decisions and administrative decisions of
general application" to be published in order to "enable govern'58
ments and interested sectors to become acquainted with them.
Assuming that "sectors" is meant to include more than business
sectors, this language still falls short. While the publication of
legal texts is important to investors (and others living under a
regime), it does little to advance broader transparency and public participation.
The same section calls for the creation of "information cen55. FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas, Second Draft Agreement, Nov. 1,
2002, pmbl. FTAA.TNC/w/133/Rev.2 (not yet entered into force), available at http://
www.ftaa-alca.org/ftaadraft02/draft__e.asp#uptonotel [hereinafter Second Draft Agreement]. (Note that chapter numbers in this and all following citations are tentative and
based on the text presented on the FTAA-ALCA website.)
56. Second Draft Agreement, supra note 55, at pmbl.
57. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
58. Second Draft Agreement, supra note 55, art. 7.1 (emphasis added).
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ters," but again these appear to be open to governments, not the
public. There is also a proposed paragraph that calls for the
FTAA Secretariat to "be a clearinghouse for information provided by the Member States in the cases established in this
Agreement."5 9 It is not clear whether this is a public clearinghouse, or again inter-governmental, nor how much public information it would generate in any event. Also, once again, this
provision is bracketed.
In the chapter on Dispute Resolution, a critical concern for
the public, there is not yet a certain, meaningful mechanism for
participation. Several provisions would call for non-State experts
to join dispute panels or provide technical support to governments, 60 but the nature of this input would appear limited.
Outside experts would serve in essence as government consultants, not public liaisons or community voices. While the experts
would bring their experience and training to the table, and this
has substantial merit, they would not be acting in a true nongovernmental capacity. Their freedom to take positions at odds
with their governmental counterparts, or to act in any representative capacity of a segment of civil society, would presumably be
very constrained.
There is a bracketed provision that would require public notice when a dispute resolution panel is established,6 ' but competing provisions make it unclear whether proceedings thereafter
would be open or closed to the public. Later in the draft, another bracketed paragraph (under the heading "Public Participation") would provide notice to the public within a week after a
dispute panel is chosen, to allow "members of the public to submit views on legal or factual issues to the neutral panel."6 2 This
is a very promising proposal because it could create, in essence,
an amicus curiae process that would give non-State actors a direct voice in disputes. But a competing bracketed provision
would resolve the matter in precisely the opposite manner. It
states unequivocally that "non-governmental participation in the
dispute settlement system in this Chapter shall not be permit59. Id. art. 8.5.
60. See, e.g., id. at Draft Chapter on Dispute Settlement, art. 12,

63.

61. Id. art. 39, 210.
62. Id. at ann. XX: Supplementary Rules of Procedure to Article 18 (Model Rules
of Procedure),
259.
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ted."6 3 The resolution of this issue is unclear, but it may be a
critical turning point for public accountability and access to justice under the FTAA.
Finally, there is a proposed requirement that information
filed in connection with a dispute be made public,6 4 but again
this is bracketed, and constrained by provisions for the protection of "confidential information" whose scope is yet unclear.6 5
V. ACCESS TO FTAA MINISTERIAL MEETINGS: PRE-QUITO
From the first meeting of trade ministers in Denver in June
1995, non-profit CSOs have sought access to the ministers and
their delegations, but without much success. In Denver, the Audubon Society and several other environmental organizations
hosted a meeting on trade and the environment that was parallel
to the Ministerial meeting, but organizers were unable to obtain
credentials for NGO forum participants to attend sessions with
the ministers or to interact directly with the ministers.6 6 The Inter-American Organization of Workers and the AFL-CIO also organized a parallel labor forum and staged a protest outside the
hotel where the ministers were meeting.6 7 Over time, these early
efforts gave rise to a periodic series of academic, expert and activist meetings and workshops where public concerns about the
proposed FTAA were aired. Many of the organizations involved
in these efforts eventually formed the Hemispheric Social Alliance ("HSA"). 6 8
Business organizations, for their part, had greater success in
reaching trade negotiators. Beginning in Denver, businesses
played host to trade delegations through conferences and cocktail parties. Some business associations reportedly paid for the
travel and lodging of certain delegates from Latin America and
63. Id. art. 4, 26.
210.
64. Id. art 39,
65. Id. For examples of potential restrictions on information deemed "confidential," see id. at 44(c), 263(e).
66. The author was a participant in the Denver CSO meeting on Trade and Environment and this reference is based on contemporaneous interviews and conversations
with organizers.
67. BACK TO MIAMI: A HISTORY OF CITIZEN'S EvENTs PARALLEL TO THE OFFICIAL
FTAA MEETINGS (White Paper from the Alliance for Responsible Trade, 2003) available
at http://www.art-us.org [hereinafter ART White Paper].
68. See discussion infra Part V.B.
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69
the Caribbean to attend the Denver Ministerial meeting.
These early efforts were repeated and expanded at subsequent
Ministerial meetings and gave rise to the Americas Business Forum.

A. The Americas Business Forum
Business interests organized a forum parallel to the Denver
Ministerial meeting in 1995 to discuss concerns of the for-profit
sector, which ranged from market access to non-tariff barriers
and investment provisions. 70 This forum, later denominated the
"First" Americas Business Forum ("ABF"), enjoyed a special relationship to the official Ministerial meeting from the beginning,
and its participants enjoyed special access. After Denver, the
ABF refined its program and organized itself around thematic
areas for which working groups were forming even before official FTAA negotiations began in 2000. As governments formed
working groups, for example, to negotiate language on investment, services, and government procurement, the ABF held
workshops with an identical structure. By the time of the Fourth
Meeting of Ministers in San Jose, Costa Rica in 1998, the ABF
claims to have "formulated around 210 recommendations covering a wide range of issues, which were considered official within
the parameters of the FTAA working groups."7
At the 2003 Ministerial meeting in Miami, the ABF continued its legacy of well-financed access. Former U.S. Ambassador
to the OAS, Luis Lauredo, served as executive director of the
2003 ABF in Miami at the same time he was chairing "FTAA
Miami, Inc." - the official effort to bring the eventual FTAA
Secretariat to Miami. 7 2 On the eve of President Bush's campaign
to return to the White House (a campaign heavily dependent on
69. Interview with participants in Denver Ministerial, in Denver, Colo. (June,
1995).
70. See Miami FTAA 2003, Background, First Americas Business Forum ("ABF"),
Denver, Colo.,June 1995, at http://www.miamiftaa2003.com/background-forum-denver.htm.
71. Miami FTAA 2003, Background, Fourth Americas Business Forum, San Jose,
Costa Rica, Mar. 1998, at http://www.miamiftaa2003.com/background-forumcostarica.htm.
72. See Media Advisory, Miami 2003 VIII Americas Business Forum, Wednesday
Media Availability for Ambassador Luis Lauredo, the Executive Director for Miami
FTAA (Nov. 18, 2003) available at http://www.co.miami-dade.fl.us/oem/FTAA/Library/FTAA/1 1. 19.2003_ABFPR2.pdf.
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a Florida constituency), one need only imagine the access that
such credentials might engender. In addition to hosting receptions and cocktail parties for trade delegates, ABF participants
were granted access to senior officials and influential leaders, including appearances and speeches by Florida Governor Jeb
Bush, U.S. Senator Bob Graham, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Ambassador Roger F.
Noriega.7 3
B. The Hemispheric Social Alliance
Even as the ABF became more focused and more integrated
into the Ministerial process from 1995 through 2002, the concerns of CSOs critical of an FTAA seemed to become more diffuse. FTAA critics in the non-profit world could not count on
fundamental support for trade liberalization and the FTAA as a
rallying point, and began to divide into two general camps: 1)
those arguing that the FTAA being negotiated by trade ministers
could be supported, with reservation, if it addressed fundamental concerns such as the environment and investment equity; and
2) those arguing that the FTAA is fundamentally flawed and
should not be supported under any circumstances. For ease of
reference, these two camps can be thought of as FTAA "reformers" and "resisters," although there is a broad range of highly
nuanced positions among CSOs that do not fit neatly into one
category or another. Many CSOs might be considered conditional reformers,"4 and there are also many CSOs that use the
language of resistance, yet do not claim to oppose trade liberalization under all circumstances.7 5
No cohesive or consistent CSO mechanism surfaced until
73. Richard Noriega, Encouraging Success in the Western Hemisphere: Remarks
to the Americas Business Forum's FTAA Ministerial State of Florida Luncheon (Nov.
18, 2003) available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/26359.htm.
74. For example, some organizations take the position that the FTAA must address
a particular key issue championed by the organization (a reform position); and ifthat
issue is not addressed, the FTAA should be opposed (a resist position).
75. Some groups claim that they cannot support "this FTAA" as currently constructed by negotiators, and cite a range of conditions under which a regional trade
accord would be acceptable. See, e.g., American Friends Service Committee, Say Yes to
Fair Trade - Say No to FTAA available at http://grassrootsvoices.org/ftaa.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2004) (promoting what it calls "fair trade" principles, and adopting a profair trade position and opposing an FTAA); Sarah Anderson, et al., Alternatives for the
Americas, Building a People's Hemispheric Agreement, available at http://www.web.ca/
%7Ecomfront/alts4americas/eng/eng.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2004) (arguing that
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the HSA emerged from the early efforts of organized labor opposed to the FTAA. The HSA has been variously described as a
"coalition" of "labor unions and citizens groups, "76 a "protest
group,' ' 77 a "multinational populist coalition,' " 7' a "labor and
NGO network,

'7

'

and a "network of organizations."'

0

It can

probably best be described as part network and part coalition.
Its issue orientation, organizational capacity, and funding have
been historically tied to organized labor, although it certainly
has broader appeal. HSA has attracted CSOs that are concerned
with the neo-liberal vision for integrating the Western Hemisphere through trade, and a deep mistrust of the proposed
FTAA is a common denominator among the organizations that
participate in its activities."1
The HSA organized a "parallel citizens forum"8 2 during the
trade Ministerial meeting in Belo Horizonte, Brazil in 1997, and
thirteen organizations issued a 'Joint Declaration by unions and
NGOs from around the western hemisphere on the Free Trade
Area of the Americas," entitled "Building a Hemispheric Social
Alliance to Confront Free Trade." 3 The document reflects ef"[a]t this stage of the struggle, it is not enough to oppose, to resist and to criticize. We
must build a proposal of our own and fight for it").
76. Diana Marrero, Miami Preparesfor Trade Summit; Police Focus on Security Concerns,
SUN-SENTINEL, June 29, 2003, Broward Metro Edition, at lB.
77. Ruth Walker, Big Protestsfor a Big Trade Zone, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Apr. 23,

2001, at 6.
78. Bob Deans, Summit of the Americas: Tough Barrier: Populist Opposition, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Apr. 22, 2001, at 5B.
79. Doreen Hemlock, Making World Trade Fair; Next Stop for Growing Movement is
Getting a Seat at the BargainingTable, SUN-SENTINEL, May 6, 2001, Broward Metro Edition,
at IG.
80. Santiago People's Summit Addresses Labor, Environment, Economic Issues, 15 BNA
INT'L TRADE REP. 16, Apr. 22, 1998, at 708.
81. See Frances Lee Ansley, Rethinking Law In The Twenty-First Century Workplace:
Article & Essay: Rethinking Law In Globalizing Labor Markets, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
369, 425-26 (1998). See generally Alliance for Responsible Trade (U.S.-based organization), at http://www.art-us.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
82. "Parallel forums" is a name given to civil society events that are staged to coincide with official meetings of government officials as a way to bring attention to a range
of issues that participants would like to see addressed in the formal meetings. In the
Western Hemisphere, they have included "Peoples' Summits" staged parallel to the
Presidential Summits of the Americas in Santiago, Chile in 1998 and Quebec City, Canada in 2001 and the parallel forums that gave rise to the HSA during Trade Ministerial
meetings starting in Belo Horizonte, Brazil in 1997.

83. The Development Group for Alternative Policies, Building a Hemispheric Social
Alliance to Confront Free Trade (May 15, 1997), available at http://www.developmentgap.
org/beloeng.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
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forts to unite labor interests with broader social concerns relating to trade integration, and states an intention to "achieve effective complementarity between the perspectives and action
strategies of the trade-union movement and those of other social
movements." Participants in parallel forums during the Presidential Summit in Santiago, Chile in 1998 and the trade Ministerial meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica in 1999 further discussed
and shaped the HSA, and it was formally "launched" at the Presidential Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in 2001,84 where
participants helped organize the "Peoples' Summit."
Even before this formal launching, during the Toronto Ministerial meeting in 1999, HSA participants organized the first direct meeting between non-profit CSOs and trade ministers when
eighteen ministers and deputy ministers attended a meeting with
an estimated 200 civil society representatives.8 5 The meeting was
later described as "surreal" by one observer, as participants reportedly talked past each other, reading prepared statements
and engaging in little real dialogue. 6
VI. THE QUITO MINISTERIAL
A. The CEDA/FFLA Workshop -

Background

As planning took place for the Ministerial meeting in Quito,
Ecuador in 2002, a new element was added to the public discourse by a group of CSOs focused on environment and sustainable development concerns. The Ecuadorian Center for Environmental Law ("CEDA") and the Foundation for the Future of
Latin America ("FFLA") joined fourteen other CSOs and academic organizations to organize a two-day CSO conference in
Quito to run parallel to the Quito Ministerial meeting. The
CEDA/FFLA event included five simultaneous workshops on sustainability assessments, market access, investment, intellectual
84. Robin Wright, Summit of the Americas Activists in Quebec Show Evolution of an Opposition Protests: The Myriad Groups and Individuals Clashing With Police Are United Not as
Foes of Globalization But as Objectors to Its Human Cost, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2001, at Al0
(quoting John Cavanaugh, director of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington,
D.C. and an active participant in the HSA).
85. See ART White Paper, supra note 67, at 3.
86. See Karen Hansen-Kuhn, Back to Miami: a History of Citizens'Events Parallelto the
Official FTAA Meetings, in ALLIANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE TRADE (Mar. 2003) available at
http://%v.art-us.org/docs/backrmiami.pdf.
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property and biodiversity, and civil society participation. 7
About 100 participants from eighty CSOs attended the workshops, and although the sessions were held outside the Quito
security perimeter, governmental delegates from at least five
countries attended and participated in a number of sessions.8 8
At the invitation of the Ecuadorian government, participants in the CEDA/FFLA workshops were permitted to present
their results at a meeting of the trade ministers, along with the
HSA and a forum of parliamentarians from the region. 9 One of
the five workshops at the CEDA/FFLA event related to civil society participation, and the results of that workshop are outlined
below.9 °
B. The CEDA/FFLA Public ParticipationWorkshop and Priorities

Issues

Because the most current revised draft FTAA text was not
made public in advance of the CEDA/FFLA workshop, participants could not comment on specific issues in the text. Instead
they used the first draft (released sixteen months earlier in July
2001) as point of departure, and focused on broader principles
and mechanisms for public participation. Participants drew
their proposals from comparative examples in constitutions and
domestic laws, and from the terms of, and experience with, existing multilateral environmental and trade agreements.
The following section highlights the key areas discussed by
the Quito working group on participation, and seeks to provide
some context for the issues and priorities that emerged during
the workshop.9 1
1. Participation in Design and Implementation
Participants drew a distinction between participation in the
87. See

TOWARDS CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN THE AMERICAS, MEMOIRS OF THE

(CEDA 2003) [hereinafter CEDA/FFLA PROCEEDINGS].
88. See id., List of Participants, at 93.
89. See infra 144-47 and accompanying text.
90. See generally CEDA/FFLA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 87 (providing results of
other workshops).
91. See CEDA/FFLA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 87, at ch. 5 (providing the report on
the Public Participation Workshop). Because the outcome of the Public Participation
working group was a consensus effort, the authoritative source for the interests of participants is the text of the consensus document. Id. at 90-91.
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT WORKSHOPS IN THE QUITO MINISTERIAL
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design of the agreement (during negotiations) and participation
in the administration of the agreement itself through more permanent institutions and procedures. The mechanisms in each
2
phase are distinct, as are the motivations for participation.1
As a practical matter, participants acknowledged little time
remains for participation during the negotiating process, 3 and
that the draft has already moved forward without a mechanism
for public input apart from the SOC. Nevertheless, participants
emphasized the importance of including the public even in the
final phases of negotiations. They also noted that, whatever solution is found for the short-term, a permanent mechanism for
participation should be included in the FTAA text, and several
94
recommendations address how this mechanism might operate.
2. Participation at a National and Regional Level
Participants stressed the need to create opportunities for
participation at both a national and regional level. Although the
CEDA/FFLA meeting was a regional event, many of the participant's concerns and recommendations (in all five parallel workshops) related to national policies. Workshop participants thus
agreed that there is a need to implement regional policies and
programs domestically - again emphasizing the importance of
domestic dialogue relating to hemispheric priorities.
Participants cited the example of the United States, which
has a number of trade-related public advisory committees that
formalize participation in the formulation of national trade policy. The U.S. Trade and Environment Advisory Committee
("TEPAC"), membership, for example, includes "representatives
from environmental interest groups, industry (including the environmental technology and environmental services industries),
agriculture, services, non-federal governments, and consumer interests." 5 The TEPAC provides policy advice to the office of the
U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR"), and following the negotiation of a trade agreement, prepares a report on the agreement
92. Id. at 72.
93. At the time of the Quito Workshop, only two years remained before the scheduled conclusion of FTAA negotiations.
94. See CEDA/FFLA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 87, at 73.

95. Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep., Charter of the Trade and Env't Policy Advisory
Comm., 1 2 (2001), at http://www.ustr.gov/outreach/tepaccharter.htm (last visited
Mar. 5, 2004).

1092

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 27:1066

to the President, to Congress, and to the USTR, including an
"advisory opinion on whether and to what extent the agreement
96
promotes the interests of the United States.
There are also public advisory committees associated with
the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), both at
a national and tripartite level. The environmental side agreement to NAFTA creates a tripartite Joint Public Advisory Committee ('jPAC") composed of presidential appointees from each
of the three parties as well as National Advisory Committees in
each country.9 7 The JPAC meets regularly to discuss transboundary environmental matters relevant to the trade agreement and serves as a conduit for public input through hearings,
meetings and workshops.9 8 It also advises the North American
Commission on Environmental Cooperation ("NACEC") Council (the senior environmental officers in each country) through
written communications and regular in camera sessions with
Council.9 9 The NACEC Council also holds annual open meetings to which the public is invited.'0 °
Participants also pointed to the work of Grupo Zapallar in
South America as an example of a less formal, voluntary dialogue between government officials and non-governmental trade
experts. Zapallar is an informal group of CSOs and government
officials that meets and corresponds to exchange ideas, environmental issues related to trade, as well as broader economic and
social concerns.'
While Zapallar is a regional group, one of its
collateral functions is to permit interaction between governmental representatives and their nongovernmental counterparts
about national concerns, in an informal, regional setting.
Participants also noted a more formal South American
96. Id. at 3.
97. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 1993, U.S.-Can.Mex., arts. 16-17, available at http://www.cec.org/pubs inforesources/lawtreat_
agree/naaec/index.cfm?varlan=english (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) (referring to Joint
Public Advisory Committee ('JPAC"), and the National Advisory Committee, respectively).
98. Id. art. 16.
99. Id. See also Who We Are /Joint Public Advisory Committee, at http://www.cec.org/
who we-are/jpac/index.cfm?varlan=english (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
100. See Who We Are, Council for the Commission of Environmental Cooperation,
at http://www.cec.org/whowe-are/council/index.cfm?varlan=english
(last visited
Mar. 5, 2004).
101. CEDA/FFLA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 87, at 73, 81.
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mechanism, Committee 6 of MERCOSUR, 0 2 which provides
some access to the public at a regional level, while creating an
opportunity for government officials and their non-governmental counterparts to discuss issues of domestic concern. 0 3
Quito workshop participants concluded that access should
be encouraged at the national level to inform national trade
delegations and to encourage national solutions to the challenges of trade integration. At the same time, access at the regional level should be emphasized through cooperation, information exchange, and dialogue. t °4 In some cases, regional
mechanisms can serve to address trans-boundary issues, and in
other cases regional discourse helps create a basis for informal
dialogue about domestic issues away from the immediate pressures of domestic politics. Participants agreed that regional participation mechanisms add substantial value and should be
10 5
strengthened and expanded.
3. Information Access and Transparency
Governments consistently emphasize that participation by
civil society in governmental deliberations and policy-making
1 6 While some
should be "responsible.""
officials undoubtedly
use this term as a code word for supportive, polite (even enthusiastic) affirmations of governmental policies and programs, "responsible participation" is more appropriately understood to
mean public input that is informed, articulate, and respectful of
democratic processes and institutions, regardless of whether it is
10 7
supportive of any particular individual, institution or issue.
But participation without information is not likely to be informed or articulate, and it is less likely to offer constructive
102. See Tratado para la Constituci6n del Mercado Comfn del Sur
("MERCOSUR") [Treaty Establishing a Common Market between Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay], Mar. 26, 1991, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., U.N. Doc. A/46/155
(Apr. 19, 1991), 30 I.L.M. 1041 (1991).
103. See, e.g., CEDA/FFLA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 87, at 81 (noting presentation
of Marfa Leichner at Quito Participation Workshop).
104. Id. at 73.
105. Id.
106. See Democracy in Development, supra note 32, at 12-13; see also Toward the Summit of the Americas on Sustainable Development: Inter-American Seminar on Public
Participation in Sustainable Development, Report on Proceedings to Government of
Uruguay, Montevideo, Uruguay, Aug. 28-30, 1996, at 6-7 (on file with author) [hereinafter Montevideo Report].
107. See Montevideo Report, supra note 106, at 6-7.
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ideas that will prove useful as policy decisions are being formulated. The Quito working group on participation found serious
failures in the transparency of FTAA negotiations to date, and
there was broad agreement that more information should flow
from the process in order to keep civil society better informed of
progress, issues, and obstacles."' 8 Participants recognized that
there is a time and place for confidentiality, and appreciated the
need to balance transparency and confidentiality to allow trade
delegations to represent their constituents effectively. But participants also agreed that a balance between transparency and
confidentiality in FTAA negotiations has been absent. 10 9 Secrecy
has dominated the FTAA process at the expense of informed
and constructive public participation. Quito participants called
for a greater effort to open the negotiations and to inform the
broader public about issues and concerns as they arise, and they
were confident that this could be done without compromising
10
the confidentiality to which trade delegations are entitled.
The example cited above relating to alternate bracketed
language for amicus participation in dispute resolution under
the FTAA provides a useful case in point."' As delegations are
formulating their positions relating to this critical aspect of the
final text, the need for confidentiality is obvious. Confidentiality
might even extend to the initial dialogue among negotiators
about how to frame a compromise proposal on amicus participation. But once alternate language is offered - and competing
proposals are tabled that are so clearly opposite in intent and
result - the subtle art of negotiation has given way to public
positions that are formulated, proffered, and published. At this
point, the public has a right to know more about the proposed
alternatives, including which delegation (s) proposed the alternative language and what intent is behind the competing proposals.
In this example, the alternatives are clearly opposite and
manifestly important to the public in the operation of a future
FTAA. The competing proposals in the draft text are:
Alternative 1: public notice of panel selection must be pro108.
109.
110.
111.

CEDA/FFLA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 87, at 73-74.
Id.
Id. at 74.
See discussion supra Part VI.B.3.
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vided within one week in order to allow "members of the public to
1 2
submit views on legal orfactual issues to the neutralpanel."'
Alternative 2: "[non-governmental participation in the dispute settlement system in the Chapter shall not be permitted.]"I 3
If civil society organizations are provided with information
about the alternate proposals, they will be in a better position to
know what their governments are proposing in the name of the
public. Again, the most compelling arguments for negotiating
confidentiality are lost once delegations table specific language.
There are no trade secrets, no private plans, no confidential business information, no scientific formulas, no blueprints or patents: only competing proposals on an issue that the public
deems vital. Yet only the public remains in the dark. Giving the
public information about which government has made which
proposal will put the citizens who elected that government in a
position to open a dialogue with their representatives and seek
alternatives at a domestic level. Such an approach cannot harm
the multilateral process, and instead will only facilitate the "responsible participation" so dear to the hearts of public officials.
Of course, the same information might leak out through other
delegations or observers in breach of formal protocols, but a system that relies on leaks and breaches to sustain transparency is
inherently inefficient and flawed - one might even say irresponsible.
In some cases, myriad details may be superfluous - beyond
the interest or expertise of much of the public. In other cases,
details may be appropriately maintained in confidence to facilitate compromise during negotiations. Representative democracy does, after all, imply that public representatives will act in
the best interest of the public in areas of their special expertise,
and it recognizes the need for confidentiality in some circumstances. But where issues are so clearly central to the interests,
aspirations, and expertise of identifiable groups and communities (in the case of amicus participation, the issue was raised not
only by CSOs in Quito, but in a number of written submissions
to the SOC prior to Quito), 114 there is little justification in clos112. Second Draft Agreement, supra note 55, ch. 7, at 259 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
114. See FTAA, Participation of Civil Society, Contributions Received, at http://
www.ftaa-alca.org/SPCOMM/COMMCS-E.ASP (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
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ing the door. Unfortunately, blanket confidentiality does not
even ask whether the public has an interest, or expertise, to offer. It limits the public view without discernment, and does little
to serve the integrity of the process or the quality of the outcome.
4. Timeliness
Quito Participants also placed great emphasis on timeliness. 11 5 This includes timely information to the public and
timely input to negotiators. Many participants were concerned
that draft text is published long after issues are actually negotiated. ' 6 Again, responsible and constructive participation is not
possible where the public is reading history books and trying to
change decisions already made. The working group proposed
specific mechanisms for the timely release of negotiating documents - in many cases, simply pointing to procedures that are
already in place at the WTO." 7 These procedures are neither
expensive nor burdensome, and the FTAA Secretariat has the
infrastructure in place to implement them in a matter of days.
5. Funding
The Quito working group on participation also noted that
the lack of funds for participation is a major debility, even where
the political will for participation exists."" Many governments,
particularly in less-developed countries, wish to consult their citizens about the FTAA, but lack the resources to do so. Small and
poorly-funded trade delegations are not in a position to speak
with civil society about the details of the proposed FTAA, and
capacity within the broader public to understand the details of
the agreement is also limited. Training, capacity building and
education, along with open public dialogue about the FTAA, are
obvious solutions.
At Quito, trade ministers announced the creation of a Hemispheric Cooperation Program ("HCP") designed in part to provide resources to assure the success of the FTAA." t9 To date,
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

CEDA/FFLA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 87, at 74-75.
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Second Draft Agreement, supra note 55, at ch. 4, art. 13.
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. most of the funding seems to be targeted for traditional infrastructure and logistics. 2 ' While these concerns are important,
resources should also be devoted to informing and engaging citizens in the process of constructing and implementing the FTAA.
Some resources should be targeted at concerns and priorities
identified by the public through forums such as the Quito workshops, through the SOC and through other mechanisms.
The trade delegations that are negotiating and drafting the
FTAA text recognize that the result of their work will be one of
the most important regional economic instruments in recent history.12 1 As a regional instrument, its political, economic, and social impact could be unparalleled. If this is the case, why not
invest the funds needed to assure that the FTAA is also a tool to
strengthen and build democracy and an example of democratic
governance at its best? Why not devote the resources to assure
that the concerns and priorities articulated by the affected populations are discussed and resolved to the greatest extent possible?
In simple economic terms, a participatory FTAA process should
be viewed not as a cost, but as an investment in the instrument
itself, an investment in public confidence and support, and an
investment in democratic governance.
6. The Existing SOC
Workshop participants were critical of the existing Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil
Society ("SOC") as a participation mechanism. 12 2 Reasons for
concern included:
0 Substantive issues are submitted to a single source, with
no expertise about particular issues, and thus limited
ability to articulate those concerns within the FTAA.
120. Decisions about funding priorities are still being discussed by governments,
but interviews by the author with trade officials and development officers from the region suggest that most funding will be targeted to trade infrastructure, with little emphasis placed on funding public input mechanisms.
121. This recognition is obvious from a review of the declarations issued from successive trade ministers meetings. See generally FTAA, Trade Ministerial Meetings, Ministerial Declarations, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Minis-e.asp (last visited Mar.
5, 2004).
122. CEDA/FFLA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 87, at 75. While the Quito participation working group participants were critical of the SOC (referred to in the CEDA/
FFLA PROCEEDINGS as the CGR), it should be noted that a number of changes to the
SOC were implemented following Quito. See discussion supra Part 11I.
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Several issues, such as the environment, present distinct
challenges that must be addressed with a background of
technical knowledge and expertise. An omnibus committee without specialized knowledge cannot adequately
manage such issues.12 3
* The process is a "mere post office box." It requires CSOs
and individuals to submit formal written comments but
does not create any forum for a more dynamic exchange
of information or ideas. There is no procedure for discussion or clarification. In essence, the SOC is not a participatory mechanism, but a tool for collecting written
comment. 124
* There is no requirement that comments be taken into
account by negotiators, or even substantively reviewed.
The SOC simply passes comments on to working groups
and summarizes the comments received. It is not clear
what becomes of the comments after they enter the pro125
cess.
While Quito participants did not call for the SOC to be
abandoned, they were clear in their concern that this mechanism alone is insufficient. They urged that it be amplified and
supplemented, and made a number of proposals toward that
end. 126

Participants were joined by a representative of the Chilean
government, who described a proposal to expand upon and improve the existing SOC mechanism,1 27 but they expressed concern that the proposal would not fundamentally alter or supplement the existing model. Participants clearly appreciated the
Chilean representative for taking the time to describe and consult with civil society regarding the proposal, and supported
Chile's desire to improve mechanisms for participation. Yet,
123. CEDA/FFLA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 87, at 75.

124. Id. at 75-76.
125. Id. at 76. It should be noted that several key changes were made to the SOC
in the months immediately preceding and following the Quito workshop, including the
development of a series of public workshops on key issues relating to the FTAA. See
FTAA, Participation of Civil Society, Issue Meetings and Regional Seminars, at http://www.
ftaa-alca.org/SPCOMM/COMMCSE.ASP (last visited Mar. 5, 2004). These changes
had not been fully implemented at the time of the Quito workshop.
126. See CEDA/FFLA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 87, at 76.
127. See Pablo Lazo, Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, Chile,
Presentation, in CEDA/FFLA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 87, at 82.
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they cited the concerns outlined above as essential impediments
to the efficacy of the SOC, and questioned how a meaningful
128
alternative could be built upon the present model.
7. Preferential Access for the Americas Business Forum
There was a broad perception among the Quito working
group participants that the business sector has had far greater
access to trade officials than non-profit or public interest
groups. 1 29 The degree of access varies from one government to
the next, but there can be little doubt that the for-profit enterprises and their trade associations have the resources to reach
out to officials, and have the clout to make that outreach meaningful. There can also be little doubt that even the public perception of preferential access has raised credibility questions and
fueled opposition to an FTAA before it even gets off the
ground.' 3 0 Quito participants pointed in particular to the ABF
and its preferential contacts with trade negotiators. They questioned the equity and fairness of ABF's access and called for a
more balanced approach in future mechanisms for public participation. Quito participants asked that any special access for the
131
Business Forum be extended to others or stopped altogether.
8. Permanent Environmental Cooperation Mechanism
Quito participants agreed that the most important tool for
participation in the long term under any final FTAA is the creation of a "permanent institutional mechanism for participation
128. See Miami ATSDF Proceedings, supra note 51. While Quito workshop participants expressed a number of concerns about the proposal presented at Quito, it should
be noted that Chile continued to engage civil society on FTAA issues after Quito, and
returned to the Miami Ministerial meeting in 2003 with a far stronger proposal for
integrating civil society into the FTAA process. The Chilean proposal in Miami called
for a permanent consultative mechanism and was ultimately reflected in the commitment to study and entertain such a proposal in the Miami Declaration. The author
reviewed a copy of the proposal for a permanent mechanism that was tabled by Chile in
Miami (on file with author). The same Chilean government representative, Pablo Lazo,
joined the participation and democracy workshops at the ATSDF in Miami to present
the new proposal and to discuss options and alternatives with civil society participants.
Mr. Lazo was subsequently chosen as the Chair of the SOC. Chile has become a leader
in the effort to engage civil society in the FTAA process, and its representatives have
been willing to join in the public discourse about democratizing the trade process.
129. See CEDA/FFLA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 87, at 76.
130. Id.
131. Id. See also discussion infra Part VII.A (regarding the history of the ABF and
its participation at the Miami Ministerial meeting).
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and cooperation."' 31 2 They argued that such a mechanism would
help citizens address trade-related concerns at a regional level
and support FTAA parties in doing so at a local level.
Most of the participants in the Quito workshop were from
academic and non-governmental organizations concerned with
environmentally sustainable development or sustainable development more broadly 3 ' - and they expressed a particular interest in a mechanism that can address environmental issues in
the context of an FTAA.' 3 4 This would not exclude other mech13 5
anisms dealing with issues such as labor or indigenous rights,
but workshop participants focused on their area of expertise.
They called for the creation of a "permanent hemispheric environmental cooperation mechanism,"'1 36 and cited examples such
as the NAFTA Commission for Environmental Cooperation and
137
the MERCOSUR Committee 6 as useful models to examine.
While some proposed a more general call for "mechanisms of
cooperation," the final consensus called for a single, permanent,
mechanism for environmental cooperation; trade raises important and highly technical environmental issues that should be
treated in a substantive manner by a specialized institution. 13
9. Access to Dispute Resolution
Many of the concerns of Quito workshop participants and
others in civil society relating to the FTAA arise from the interpretation of existing trade agreements (such as the WTO and
NAFTA) by dispute resolution panels and appellate bodies. Participants recognized that the jurisprudence of trade, and notjust
the text of trade agreements, has a great potential to shape the
ultimate impact of the agreement in areas of public concern. 3 9
Participants agreed that the public should have a well-defined and substantive role in dispute resolution procedures.
This should be done through transparent procedures and
132. CEDA/FFLA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 87, at 76-77.
133. See id. at 93-97 (providing list of participants at Quito workshops).
134. Id. at 76-77.
135. Id. at 76, n.45 (noting that participants agreed that cooperation mechanisms
are appropriate with respect to other areas of keen public interest, such as labor and
indigenous rights).
136. Id. at 76.
137. See discussion, supra Part VI.A.2.
138. See CEDA/FFLA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 87, at 77, 91.

139. Id. at 77.
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through participatory mechanisms such as amicus curiae briefs.
Amicus briefs are an established mechanism allowing interested
parties to present views on the law and facts of a case to dispute
resolution bodies supplementing the submissions of parties.
They strengthen the integrity and substance ofjudicial outcomes
without burdening the system or impeding efficiency.
Despite the broad acceptance of amicus briefs in judicial
procedures, no such procedure is set forth clearly in the draft
FTAA text. Instead, there are competing provisions relating to
dispute resolution. a4 ° In one case, the proposal would specifically prohibit amicus briefs,"' and in the other, the language
would appear to create a basis for them to be filed.' 4 2 Workshop
participants supported the creation of a clear mechanism for the
submission of amicus briefs by interested persons and organizations as a point of entry for citizens into the dispute procedures
and jurisprudence of an FTAA.
C. The CEDA/FFLA Workshop -

Meeting with Ministers

The meeting between civil society participants and trade
ministers in Quito was more theater than dialogue.' 43 In fact
none of the twenty-two ministers and other governmental representatives present even took the podium.'4 4 The Ecuadorian
government had arranged for approximately one hour with the
ministers, which was to have been divided equally for presentations by representatives from the CEDA/FFLA workshops, the
HSA and participants in a "Hemispheric Meeting Regarding
FTAA and the Role of Legislators" ("Encuentro Continental
sobre el ALCA y el rol de los Parlamentos"). 1 4 5 These were the
140. See discussion supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
141. Second Draft Agreement, ch. 7, at 26. The bracketed proposal states, "Nongovernmental participation in the dispute settlement system in the Chapter shall not be
permitted."
142. Id. at 259. The bracketed proposal states that public notice of panel selection
must be provided within one week in order to allow "members of the public to submit
views on legal or factual issues to the neutral panel."
143. The author was a participant in the session as part of the CEDA/FFLA delegation of approximately fifteen persons, and the account that follows is based on personal
observation.
144. No official list was provided to confirm the number or identity of governmental participants, but the author counted twenty-two representatives and recognized several as trade ministers, including the ministers from Ecuador and Canada, and the U.S.
Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick.
145. Meeting participants produced the "Quito Declaration," outlining a number
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three separate civil society forums or events that had taken place
in Quito surrounding the Ministerial meeting. Each organizing
group was invited to bring approximately fifteen representatives
to the meeting and to use approximately twenty minutes to make
their case.

146

What unfolded was chaos. The meeting took place in a
small theater, and the governmental representatives were seated
on the stage in folding chairs facing the CSO representatives,
who were seated as an audience. Instead of fifteen representatives, more than fifty participants from the HSA meetings entered the room chanting slogans, and carrying signs and banners.' 4 7 The presentations from each of the three groups
amounted to little more than recitations from prepared texts,
and no questions or answers followed. The HSA presentation
was punctuated a number of times by applause and further
chants from the audience; on occasion someone would stand up
from the audience and shout at the governmental representatives. During the CEDA/FFLA presentation, audience members
interrupted a number of times to shout derogatory slogans.1 4
One of the hecklers made assertions about who could claim to
"represent the true civil society." Another claimed that the
FTAA was a "Gringo neo-colonial conspiracy." At one point, an
audience member who had moved behind a CEDA/FFLA
speaker as she was addressing the ministers began stepping forward and pushing her from behind.'4 9 In response, an officer
from the Ecuadorian armed forces crossed the room and positioned himself between the two. The image of an Ecuadorian
military officer creating a buffer between two "civil" society repof concerns regarding the proposed FTAA, and made a presentation to the Ministers.
Encuentro Continental sobre el ALCA y el rol de los Parlamentos [Hemispheric Meeting Regarding FTAA and the Role of Legislators], Declaracion de Quito [Quito Declaration], Oct. 29-30, 2002, available at http://www.llacta.org/organiz/coms/com202.
htm. Information regarding the meeting can be found (in Spanish) at http://www.
llacta.org/notic/021031a.htm.
146. This information was obtained in a conversation by the author with CEDA/
FFLA organizers, who had negotiated the terms of participation with representatives of
the Ecuadorian government.
147. One of the more memorable, and repeated, chants was "Quito, Quito, Quito,
con ALCA Cuidadito," ["Quito, Quito, Quito, be a little careful with the FTAA"].
148. These were audience members who had entered the room with the HSA,
although the author does not know their affiliation.
149. The author does not know the individual, or their affiliation, although he had
not been a participant in the CEDA/FFLA workshops.
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resentatives is one enduring metaphor for the encounter. 5 '
Although no substantive interaction occurred between
CSOs and trade ministers during what was billed as the Quito
"dialogue," the event did serve to highlight the need for more
careful planning to promote meaningful discourse in the future.
The event also crystallized concerns about dynamics among various elements of civil society.
VII. THE MIAMI MINISTERIAL
A. The ATSDF Workshop -

Background

Following Quito, some of the organizers of the CEDA/FFLA
dialogue began to discuss the need to build on the experience in
Quito. "' There was general agreement that the opening for a
direct dialogue with the ministers was important, and needed to
be expanded and strengthened, but there were three dominant
concerns.
First, the CEDA/FFLA dialogue had involved CSOs focused
on environmental and sustainable development issues. This was
not an explicit or planned limitation, rather one that evolved
more by virtue of the organizations that had agreed to host the
event and the organizational contacts to which they reached out.
This served a purpose in that it allowed the debate to take place
among CSOs with a relatively high degree of expertise in the
issues that were addressed, and it allowed conclusions and recommendations to be relatively concrete and focused. But it also
led to some confusion, and even expressions of resentment by
other CSOs, over the perceived claim that the CEDA/FFLA dialogue was somehow "representative" of civil society more
broadly.
Second, the staging of the CEDA/FFLA dialogue outside of
the security perimeter - and off of the official Ministerial calendar - limited the event's impact on negotiators and trade delegations. While delegates from several countries did attend the
event and join the discussions, their participation and interaction was necessarily limited. Moreover, CEDA/FFLA workshop
participants had no direct "credentialed" access to the meeting
150. Photograph on file with author.
151. The author was part of this organizing committee and the report that follows
is based on discussions and correspondence between and among members of that committee.
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place for delegates, so outreach could not be a two-way street.
The opportunity for lobbying in the original sense of the word
was lost.
Finally, the brief interaction with trade ministers was generally conceded to be non-substantive and ineffective. Even discounting the "circus" atmosphere and the disruptions described
above, the CEDA/FFLA presentation to ministers was little more
than the recitation of findings to the group, who sat passively
and did not respond. This was not a dialogue in any sense, and
it was not effective advocacy. While the documentation that
emerged from the CEDA/FFLA event was relatively substantive
and concrete, participants were unable to discuss and promote
these findings at the Ministerial level.
Planning for Miami focused on overcoming these perceived
shortcomings and bringing the CSO dialogue even closer to the
ministers and their delegations. Representatives of the USTR, as
national hosts of the Miami Ministerial meeting, were open to
the idea of building on the CEDA/FFLA workshop, and supported efforts to create a CSO forum at Miami from the outset.
Initially, representatives of the University of Miami, acting as a
local adjutant, sought to integrate the CEDA/FFLA issues (along
with broader socio-economic concerns of the non-profit sector)
into the agenda for the ABF. 5 2 The USTR was supportive and
sought to facilitate the proposal. But this effort soon failed, as
local ABF hosts declined to expand their agenda to embrace
broader social issues. In late March 2003, an alternative proposal was sent to local ABF organizers to create a separate "Americas Trade and Development Forum" that would hold separate
sessions on social issues and integrate with the ABF through
shared plenary sessions. ABF organizers also rejected this hybrid
proposal.
By early April 2003, the organizations seeking to build upon
the CEDA/FFLA forum at Quito had decided that they would
need to establish an independent forum for non-profit civil society within the security perimeter at Miami - a forum that would
be distinct from the ABF and would seek to overcome the short-

152. Dr. Robin Rosenberg, Deputy Director of the North-South Center of the University of Miami, served as principal local negotiator and adjutant for the post-Quito
organizers.
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comings of Quito. 5' This new forum, denominated the Americas Trade and Sustainable Development Forum ("ATSDF"), received formal approval from the USTR to hold a separate civil
15 4
society forum within the security perimeter.
From a logistical standpoint, a number of hurdles remained. Along with having to identify and engage additional organizing groups, define the scope of the event, secure space, organize substantive sessions, find speakers, and plan for travel,
ATSDF organizers needed to obtain participant credentials and
arrange for security checks in a post-September 11th, and postSeattle, security environment. Unlike the ABF, which could
count on the fundraising capacity of the corporate sector and
had close relations with the local host committee in Miami, the
ATSDF was organized by a collection of volunteers without dedicated project funding and with no access to the deep pockets of
the business community. To compound the logistical and financial obstacles, the ATSDF also faced political resistance from local ABF organizers who were less than enthusiastic about the creation of a "competing" public forum that would vie for the attention of ministers and delegates.
Another challenge to the ATSDF arose from an unexpected
quarter when some of the organizations associated with the HSA
raised questions, in essence, about the bona fides of the ATSDF
as a civil society forum. Within days of receiving approval from
the USTR to hold meetings inside the security perimeter, the
initial organizing group of the ATSDF held a public meeting in
Washington D.C., where a representative from the USTR announced the decision to approve the public forum, and ATSDF
153. The original organizing committee included the University of Miami NorthSouth Center, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Tulane Institute
for Environmental Law and Policy from the United States, the Canadian Foundation
for the Americas, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (from Canada), Corporaci6n Participa (from Chile), the Ecuadorian Center for Environmental
Law (from Ecuador), and the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (from Argentina). Other organizations were added to the organizing committee over time, and
came to include the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Transparency International, Partners of the Americas, the Inter-American Democracy Network, the National
Coalition on Caribbean Affairs, the Caribbean Policy Development Centre, the Center
for International Environmental Law, and the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development.
154. Correspondence relating to the creation of the ATSDF, including copies of
official correspondence from the USTR, is on file with the author.
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organizers outlined initial plans for the event.1 55 Among other
things, the ATSDF organizers described their desire to hold parallel workshops on a range of issues and concerns raised by civil
society relating to the proposed FTAA. 156 They also invited any
interested organization or network to comment on or make suggestions for an agenda in Miami, and expressly offered to integrate issues of concern into the agenda where groups or networks were willing to organize and facilitate sessions on the issues.

157

Following the May 21 meeting, a number of organizations
associated with the HSA sent a letter to the ATSDF initial organizing committee declining "at this time to provide feedback
regarding specifics of the ATSDF," and instead setting out a series of questions relating to the history of planning for the
ATSDF, and to the process for selecting issues to be addressed in
Miami and for organizing workshops and panels, among other
things.158 ATSDF organizers responded by letter answering each
of the questions, and again invited participation by HSA participants and other interested CSOs, stating:
We are actively seeking to involve as many interested organizations as possible in helping to plan and build a meaningful,
productive and substantive dialogue in Miami - and we
hope you and your colleagues will join us in this ....We are

counting on groups like yours to make suggestions and offer
their energy159to facilitate and collaborate in these workshops
and panels.
In late August, HSA groups responded by declining to partici155. More than 100 organizations attended this initial meeting on May 21, 2003 at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. Copies of the
invitation, program, and participant list are on file with the author.
156. A document was circulated following the May 21 meeting entitled, "Suggested
Issues for Americas Trade and Sustatinable [sic] Development ("ATSDF") Workshops,"
based on the discussions during the meeting (copy on file with author). It included
eleven possible themes: Trade and Public Participation; Trade and Environment;
Trade and Labor; Trade and Migration; Trade and Corruption; Trade, Democracy and
Human Rights; Trade, Institutional Reform and Capacity Building; Trade and Security;
Trade, Gender and Indigenous Issues; Trade and Investment; Trade and Agriculture.
157. A copy of the report from the May 21 meeting was circulated to participants
(on file with author).
158. The letter was sent electronically and bore the names of thirty-two organizations, beginning with the AFL-CIO (copy on file with author).
159. Letter from ATSDF Organizing Groups to HSA Participant Groups (June 13,
2003) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter June 13 Letter].
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pate in developing or organizing the ATSDF, citing concerns
about the limitations and parameters of an event inside the security perimeter and concerns that they were not initially con1 60
sulted about the structure or the ATSDF.
This correspondence between ATSDF organizers and HSA
groups raises interesting questions about "authenticity" and "legitimacy" in claiming to represent civil society viewpoints. The
HSA groups asserted an interest in access for "legitimate representatives of civil society," and "those who truly represent the
broad views of civil society," and expressed concern that the
ATSDF might not provide such access.16 1 ATSDF organizers
made no claim to be "representative" of civil society, and sought
to clarify that they had simply secured a new public space for
dialogue within the security perimeter of the FTAA and to offer
62
access to that space to any interested organization.
One proposed element of the ATSDF was a one-hour
"roundtable" with trade ministers following the two days of workshops and panels. The HSA groups asked for information about
the "process for participating in the trade ministers roundtable
and having questions answered by the ministers," and the ATSDF
organizers replied:
This has yet to be determined, and will most likely be a product of compromise with the USTR as host, and other governments. Note that the proposed roundtable is only one potential element for AFTfSD (sic). By holding workshops and
other educational activities within the "security perimeter"
and accessible to governmental staff and negotiators, we hope
to create opportunities for informal dialogue and learning
throughout the two days of meetings. Also note that this proposed element of the program will be a briefing on the results
of the discussions at the Forum. It will not be a representation to Ministers of the views of civil society as a whole - a
1 63
distinction that will be made explicit.
The HSA groups' response was:
Regrettably, it appears from your proposal that only groups
willing to organize a workshop as part of the ATSDF will be
160. Letter from HSA Participant Groups, to ATSDF Organizing Groups (Aug. 25,
2003) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter August 25 Letter].
161. Id.
162. See June 13 Letter, supra note 159.
163. Id.
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able to help shape or participate in the meeting with the ministers on the 19th ....
We feel the pre-requisite of workshop
participation may deny legitimate representatives of civil society the opportunity to present their views to trade ministers.
The result of this filtering process will not be a meaningful
and those who truly represent the
dialogue between ministers 164
broad views of civil society.
The HSA groups went on to state that they would remain
focused on organizing activities outside the security perimeter
without offering specific input or support for the ATSDF. In the
end, a number of HSA participant groups, including some identified on the correspondence, did register for and participate in
ATSDF events inside the perimeter as well as HSA events outside
the perimeter, and the ATSDF organizing committee included
groups active in the HSA. Nevertheless, this HSA-ATSDF correspondence and the underlying dynamic highlights fundamental
challenges in formulating any civil society access mechanism,
particularly at a multilateral level.
The ATSDF ultimately included parallel workshops on nine
areas: trade and agriculture; trade, democracy and human
rights; trade and environment; trade and smaller economies;
trade, participation and access; trade and sustainable livelihoods;
trade, corruption and transparency; trade, knowledge and intellectual property rights; and trade and investment. More than
300 CSO participants attended from over twenty countries and
representatives from trade ministries of at least eight countries
were present for at least part of the proceedings.
B. The ATSDF Workshop -

Issues and Priorities

The ATSDF sessions on participation and access were combined with sessions on transparency and democracy for the purpose of developing consensus proposals in plenary. 6 5 The following describes the outcomes and proposals generated by participants in these sessions.
1. Permanent Consultative Mechanism
CSOs attending the ATSDF workshops on participation,
164. August 25 Letter, supra note 160.
165. See ATSDF Program, available at http://www.miami.edu/nsc/pages/FTAA.
html (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) (on file with author).
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transparency and democracy called for governments to create a
permanent consultative mechanism for civil society within the
FTAA.166 Such a mechanism could institutionalize public access
to the FTAA secretariat and provide the public with a point of
entry into technical assistance programs and technical committees formed to address the social impacts of an FTAA.
ATSDF participants met with a trade delegate from Chile
who serves on the SOC, and discussed in detail a Chilean proposal to create a consultative mechanism.' 6 7 Participants expressed
support for the Chilean efforts and noted that the proposal was
far stronger than the document presented during the workshops
in Quito in the prior year.
Miami Participants discussed the following challenges to
creating a permanent consultative mechanism:
* How can civil society in its broadest sense be integrated
into this mechanism? The tensions in Quito and in the
preparation for Miami highlight the diversity of views
among non-profit organizations relating to trade and it
would be important not to have a civil society mechanism become captive by any one element of society.
* How can a balance be maintained where the for-profit
sector forms part of a consultative mechanism? As the
ABF has demonstrated, the for-profit sector has far
greater resources and contacts - and its positions are
more focused on trade for the sake of trade without regard for long-term social consequences. Any mechanism
for consultation should recognize these perspectives and
seek an equitable balance.
* How large should a consultative committee be? The
Chilean proposal calls for four representatives, and
CSOs found this inadequate. Greater numbers would
more easily account for the diversity of the region and
expand the opportunities for discourse. At the same
time, too large a mechanism would become unwieldy.
Participants also urged that members of civil society form a
fundamental part of any permanent mechanism - not just as
166. Summary of Outcomes: Workshop on Trade, Public Participation and Access, ATSDF, Miami 2003 (forthcoming 2004) (on file with author, available upon publication at www.law.tulane.edu/enlaw).
167. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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observers or invitees, but also as integral members of the mechanism. This of course raises questions about legitimacy and the
selection of participants to assure that CSO "members" of the
mechanism are representative of the population of the region.'6 8
It also implies a need to balance geographic representation, gender, race, ethnicity, and the inclusion of traditionally marginalized persons. It would also require some consideration of representation from different sectors, organizations, and interest
groups.
2. Transparency
Miami workshop participants expressed concern that FTAA
negotiators continue to be largely inaccessible to the public despite progress represented by the ATSDF and the dialogue with
ministers. The negotiating groups formed around FIAA issues
remain opaque to civil society and the SOC, while improving,
remains a very limited window on the process.
FTAA texts continue to be largely bracketed with no indication of which government has taken which position or offered
which alternative. Providing such information would not affect
the negotiations as governments already know which delegation
has tabled which language, but it would allow citizens a window
on their own government's positions and create a much more
meaningful domestic discourse about trade policy and negotiating ambitions.1 6 9
Miami participants also raised concerns about corruption
and transparency inherent in the international trading system,
and sought commitments to use the FTAA as a way to combat
those tendencies. The FTAA government procurement chapter,
for example, could be used to improve transparency and mini70
mize corruption in public sector contracting.1
168. The use of the term "representative" always raises concerns as some in government insist, correctly, that democratically elected governments are intended to function
as the representatives of their citizens. Nevertheless, CSOs represent viewpoints and
sectors of society by voicing concerns and opinions on trade-related issues, and it is in
this sense that the term is used. Here, the term is used as in a representative sample
(one that expresses some of the divergent views found in the region), not as in a legal
representative of a population.
169. See discussion supra Part V.A.3.
170. See Press Release, Transparency International, Santiago Summit of the Americas: Transparency International Calls for Concrete Action (Apr. 17, 1998) available at
http://www.transparency.org/pressreeases-archive/ 1998/ 1998.04.1 7.santiago.htm.
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3. Access to Cooperative Mechanisms
Participants from four of the nine Miami thematic workshops (Participation, Transparency, Democracy, and Environment) held a special joint session on cooperative mechanisms
under trade agreements, pointing to the experience of the
NAFTA Commission on Environmental Cooperation as an example of addressing trade-related social impacts in the context of a
trade agreement. The joint session highlighted such mechanisms as an opportunity for integrating the public into the trade
process. The discussion centered on existing cooperative mechanisms, both formal and informal, within trade agreements such
as the WTO, NAFTA, and MERCOSUR, and experts familiar
with their operation discussed the successes and challenges to
engaging citizens within these mechanisms.1 7 1
Based on the experiences described, participants recommended the inclusion of a cooperative mechanism within the
FTAA that engages citizens in the strengthening of trade policy
for sustainability. They proposed that such a mechanism consider and focus on the following elements:
0 permanence;
* cooperation among governments, and not "shaming"
them for failure to perform (such as the environmental
enforcement provisions of NAFTA);
* a broad view of the link between trade and social issues
so that cooperative programs can address priorities, even
where the connection to trade and investment is more
tangential;
* independence;
* capacity building;
* that the mechanism be demand driven; and that it
* provide a clear, adequate financing mechanism that can
be adjusted for inflation and currency fluctuations.
4. Civil Society Coordination
As in Quito, the experience of the ATSDF in Miami pointed
to a need for CSOs to do a better job of coordinating and collaborating among and across interest groups to make their input
more articulate and more meaningful. A number of concerns
171. See discussion supra Part VI.B.2.
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were raised on this point and recommendations focused on better communication mechanisms and the need for financing,
among other things. The discourse with the HSA also highlights
the need to think more carefully about issues of authenticity and
legitimacy, and to assure that the ATSDF and other civil society
mechanisms welcomed or created by governments do not provide a platform for one group of CSOs at the expense of another.
C. The ATSDF Workshop -

Meeting With Ministers

Following two days of workshops in which a number of
trade delegations participated,' 7 2 the USTR invited ATSDF participants to an interactive session between approximately twenty
ATSDF participants and the thirty-four trade ministers. ATSDF
representatives and Ministerial hosts made brief opening statements, followed by a more interactive question and answer period facilitated by a respected, and Pulitzer Prize-winning, local
reporter. Unlike the one-sided and chaotic experience in Quito,
the interaction between ATSDF participants and ministers in
Miami was civil and relatively substantive. It was broadcast by a
closed circuit system and is available for viewing on the web. 73
One of the most significant aspects of the meeting, from the
standpoint of continued public access to the FTAA, was the ministers' response to the ATSDF proposal for a permanent consultative mechanism within the trade agreement itself. When
ATSDF participants proposed the idea during the dialogue,
seven ministers took the floor to endorse the concept. 174 Once
the idea was tabled, and ministers began to speak on the topic,
their interest and support seemed to grow visibly. Each minister
seemed to go further than the next in expressing support for a
consultative mechanism, culminating in the representative from
172. An informal count by the author indicates that representatives from at least
eight countries attended ATSDF workshop sessions and participated in discussions.
Many joined panels as part of the formal agenda, and others attended as observers or
active audience participants. In addition, many talked informally with CSO participants
between panel sessions.
173. See USTR Resources, FTAA Miami 2003 News, Wehcasts, at www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/ftaa2003/news.htm#webcasts.
174. See ATSDF Presentationto Ministers (Part 1), Nov. 19, 2003, webcast, at http://
ftaanews.primestream.com/mediacenter/mediacenter-player_56.asp
(including comments from Trade Ministers or representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay and the United States).
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Paraguay calling for a "new global vision" of cooperation and
public participation in shaping development policy. Even the
representative from Mexico (a country reportedly cool to the
idea of a permanent consultative mechanism)' 7 5 spoke in support, although in less glowing terms than his counterparts.
It appeared that the opportunity to speak about the proposal during this broadcast session with civil society provided a context within which ministers and representatives could express
and reaffirm their support publicly. Following the meeting with
ministers, the Final Ministerial Declaration from Miami included
language endorsing the idea of a permanent consultative mechanism and calling on the SOC to study the idea and report
back.' 7 6 Paragraph 28 of the Miami Declaration stated:
We express our interest in creating a civil society consultative
committee within the institutional framework of the FTAA
upon the Agreement's entry into force. Such a committee
could contribute to transparency and the participation of civil
society on an on-going basis as the FTAA is being implemented. We instruct the Committee on Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society, in coordination with the TCI, to continue to study the issue and make
recommendations to the TNC concerning it. We ask the
TNC to review these recommendations and make a proposal
1 77
concerning this matter for our future consideration.
While there was momentum for the creation of such a committee prior to the ATSDF meeting with ministers, the language
that emerged in the Miami Declaration clearly went further than
an earlier draft, 178 and the idea may have been advanced by the
ATSDF sessions on democracy and participation, and the interaction with ministers.

179

175. Interview with trade delegates other than Mexico, in Miami, Fla., (Nov. 2003).
176. Free Trade Area of the Americas: Eighth Trade Ministerial Meeting, Declaration of Ministers, Miami, Fla., Nov. 20, 2003, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/
Ministerials/Miami/Miamie.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
177. Id. at 28.
178. See FTAA - Free Trade of the Americas, Third Draft Agreement, Nov. 21,
2003, FTAA.TNC/w/133/Rev.3, at ch. XXI, art. 4 (not yet entered into force), available
at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FAADraft03/lndex-e.asp.
179. It is difficult to argue causality, but public praise for the proposal by ministers
during the ATSDF interaction certainly did nothing to harm its prospects. Informal
conversations between the author and trade delegates on background suggest that the
ATSDF proposal and the dialogue were helpful in improving prospects for the propo-
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the historical failure to open the FTAA process to public participation is that the
presidential promises, which created the context for the FTAA,
remain unfulfilled. Even the Inter-American Democratic Charter - whether morally or legally binding - has not, to date,
informed the FTAA.
At every Inter-American Summit, presidents and heads of
State signed declarations affirming the "right" to participate
(Miami 1994) as a "basic requisite for sustainable development"
(Santa Cruz 1996). They sought to make "government institutions . . . more participatory structures" (Santiago 1998), and
committed to "the full participation of all persons" (Quebec City
2001). They even linked participation directly to the heart of
representative democracy, and affirmed that only democracies
will be eligible to attend Summits (Santiago 1998) or join the
FTAA (Quebec City 2001). But apart from offering a few bracketed statements that espouse democratic values or provide public notice, the current text of the FTAA seems largely divorced
from the fundamental democratic principles to which Western
Hemisphere heads of State have ascribed.
Does this mean that the Presidential Summit pledges are
hollow, or that the draft trade agreement is not responsive to
instructions from national capitals? Probably not. It does appear, however, that the many technical details of trade negotiation, and perhaps an understandable focus on the economics of
trade, have pulled the text away from the broader context in
which the FTAA is cast: sustainable economic prosperity must
depend upon sustainable democracy.
There is a tendency to keep inter-governmental negotiations confidential - a necessary prerogative of Nation States and this also may create a participation deficit in the process and
outcomes of trade agreements. Transparency is, understandably, anathema to negotiators, not because they are anti-democratic, but because they believe a measure of secrecy will protect
their State and assure the best result for their constituents. But,
as a matter of principle, one would hope to see a greater concern for dialogue with those constituents as decisions are made
in their names.
Public input is also problematic when one considers the vast
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range of voices and interests that will surface from civil society
during a process that is already rendered chaotic by the competing interests of thirty-four states. But more can and should be
done to engage the public during the negotiation phase of the
agreement for all of the same reasons that the Western Hemisphere heads of State so readily promote democracy in the first
place. At both a national and regional level, public participation
gives legitimacy to the process and result, and it strengthens the
political will of populations who must support ratification and
implementation after the text is finalized. The wide range of
expertise that exists outside of governmental corridors is also
more fully available to officials where an organic and meaningful
exchange of ideas is part of the process. It is true that participation implies resource allocation and sometimes delay - but
these are investments in a democratic outcome, and should not
be viewed as costs.
Any justification for closed doors recedes even further when
the negotiations are over and the trade agreement is being implemented. The principles of participation far outweigh the
principles of secrecy when multilateral policies are applied at a
national level.
A. Specific Recommendations: More Formal Commitment
to Participation
1. Permanent Consultative Mechanism for FTAA
FTAA negotiators should follow through on their expression of interest in a permanent consultative mechanism for civil
society into the operation of the FTAA. The Miami Declaration
speaks of a civil society consultative committee, but the FTAA
should include more than simply a committee of government
representatives who are interested in public voices. This would
do little more than extend the current SOC into the agreement
itself. While the SOC has certainly improved in recent years, it
cannot substitute for a more robust and meaningful point of entry.
Consideration should be given to organizing the permanent
mechanism around issues that have emerged as priority public
concerns, such as labor and the environment, and creating
meaningful opportunities for continual discourse rather than
formalistic communications. Citizen advisory committees would
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be useful as long as they are focused on specific issues and have
real access to government officials. 18 1 Working groups (again on
targeted issues) made up of government and CSO members
would be an even stronger interactive link between public representatives and the public. Consultative mechanisms should also
extend to dispute resolution and the potential role for CSOs in
filing amicus briefs to dispute resolution panels.
2. Permanent Consultative Mechanism in All
Trade Agreements
While this Article is focused on the FTAA, many of the arguments for access to that agreement are equally applicable to the
need to create meaningful public participation in all trade
agreements - during negotiation and implementation. This is
true of bilateral as well as multilateral agreements.
B. Strengthening and Broadening the ATSDF
1. Building Alliances
If and as the ATSDF continues as a means of bringing civil
society participants together, organizers should pay greater attention to the need for cooperation and alliances with other organizations and networks active in the debate over trade liberalization. This certainly includes the HSA, which has been historically active and has a particular constituency among labor
groups. It also likely includes the legislators and parliamentarians who have sought an audience in the FTAA process. While
they may not be considered traditional civil society actors (they
are, after all, elected officials), there is no doubt that they represent constituencies that have a strong interest in the outcome
of trade negotiations. While organizations and networks will no
doubt continue working on issues, and by means, that they deem
most appropriate (an inevitable and important aspect of civil society), advantages can be gained through cooperation where resources, ideas and strategies are shared, and CSO efforts are mutually reinforcing.
180. The North American Free Trade Agreement's Commission on Environmental
Cooperation (CEC), for example, features a tri-national Joint Public Advisory Committee ("JPAC") that regularly interacts with and provides advice to the senior environmental officials from the member countries. See generally, CEC, at http://www.cec.org/
who we-are/j pac/index.cfm?varlan=english.

2004]

TRADE, DEMOCRACY AND THE FTAA

1117

2. Questions of Legitimacy
While no group can purport to "speak for" civil society, the
experience at the FTAA ministers meeting in Miami highlights a
certain tension among some CSOs about who is the "legitimate"
or "authentic" voice of the public. This tension, perhaps more
appropriate for exploration through a sociological or anthropological discourse, nevertheless has repercussions for how CSOs
organize themselves and seek access to trade negotiations and
trade instruments. While alternative strategies are inevitable, little will be gained by suspicion and ill will among civil society
actors who pursue those strategies. While competition in ideas is
vital (and inevitable in a diverse society - and a diverse hemisphere), care should be taken to assure that competition for access to the limited public space in the trade arena does not become counter-productive.

